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Executive Summary 
This report was produced in the context of the Administrative Arrangement Id 34294 
between the JRC and DG CNECT to investigate and propose recommendations for the 
establishment of a European ICT security certification framework and to assess the 
feasibility of a European cybersecurity labelling framework. 
One of the key elements for the establishment of a European ICT security certification 
framework is the role of cybersecurity standards and their application in the market. 
Because cybersecurity standards have an important role in security certification and in 
general for the security of the ICT infrastructures, an analysis is needed to investigate 
the current status of cybersecurity standards, their role and their effectiveness to support 
the cybersecurity market and the European cybersecurity industry.   
To this purpose, the cybersecurity expert Scott Cadzow was requested to provide an 
analysis on the role and the current status of cybersecurity standards, which could 
support the European cybersecurity industry. The outcome of the analysis, finalised in 
February 2017, was to provide potential recommendations to improve the process of 
production and application of cybersecurity standards in Europe.  JRC complemented this 
analysis with additional considerations on the parallel effort performed by organizations 
like ECSO and ENISA and the link to the European ICT security certification framework.  
This report does not aim to provide a detailed view of cybersecurity standards in Europe. 
A number of reports by ECSO, ENISA and ETSI have recently addressed this task and this 
report refers to them for additional details on the current cybersecurity standards. The 
present report provides complementary considerations and recommendations on how to 
potentially support the European cybersecurity industry from standardisation work. 
The key recommendations provided as the conclusion of the analysis carried out in this 
report, are the following ones. 
 EU  member  states  should  define  measures  that  mandate certain provisions
for ICT devices and services prior to them being placed on the market
 Policy measures should place security proof and assurance within the market
access framework.
 SDOs should be requested to reinforce the Harmonised Standards approach for
security functions.
 The EU should consider sponsoring research and standardisation of means that
give authoritative measurement of system integrity in mutable systems.
 The EU should consider sponsoring research and standardisation of means that
allow for autonomic reporting of security events to CERTs for analysis and
distribution.
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1 Context and Background 
On May 2015 the European Commission issued a Communication (COM(2015)192) for a 
Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy for Europe. The reinforcement of trust and security 
in digital services and in the handling of personal data is a main priority of the Strategy. 
To that end, one of the 16 initiatives set in the strategy is the launch of a contractual 
Public Private Partnership (cPPP) on cybersecurity. This initiative aims to strengthen the 
EU cybersecurity industry and make sure that European citizens and businesses have 
access to more innovative, secure and user-friendly solutions that take into account 
European rules and values. The cPPP on cybersecurity was launched by Communication 
COM(2016)410, adopted by the Commission on 5th of July 2016. 
DG JRC is working together with DG CNECT in the identification, mapping and collection 
of evidences to support the development of the accompanying measures described in the 
Staff Working Document SWD(2016)216 of the Communication, designed to complement 
the establishment of the cPPP on cybersecurity. In this respect, cybersecurity 
standardization has been identified as one of the areas to be further analysed given its 
potential to support the development of the European cybersecurity industry. 
The present document reviews the landscape of standards able to support a secured 
DSM. For the purposes of the present document the security functions include the 
following: Support to identification and authentication by sector; Support to 
anonymization and pseudonymisation as required by sector (ensuring accountability of 
actions in the DSM); Support to enable verification of the integrity of data transfers and 
data stores; Means to support the availability of the DSM (e.g. by trapping and 
preventing denial of service attacks, treatment of the DSM as national and regional 
Critical Infrastructure); Means to exchange data related to attacks on, or misuse of, the 
DSM and its supporting infrastructure. 
In parallel to this JRC activity, which produced this report, other organizations have also 
investigated and identified cybersecurity standards, which are relevant to this analysis. 
In particular: 
 The European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO) has drafted an extensive 
State-of-the-Art Syllabus in 2017, with an Overview of existing Cybersecurity 
standards and certification schemes.  ECSO1 represents the industry-led 
contractual counterpart to the European Commission for the implementation of 
the cPPP described above.  
 ENISA has also produced a report on Definition of Cybersecurity, Gaps and 
overlaps in standardisation2. The first purpose of the ENISA report is to provide a 
guide for determining an appropriate understanding of the term ‘Cybersecurity’ to 
be used in the context of the intended use of the stakeholders and policy makers. 
The second purpose is to list organisations taking part in standardisation in the 
area of Cybersecurity, provide an overview of activities and identify gaps and 
overlaps. 
 ETSI has also produced ETSI TR 103 3063, which also provides an overview on 
cybersecurity standardization activities. In particular, the report aims to provide 
an insight on the various forums that develop techniques, technical standards and 
operational practices, global and national centres of excellence and major IT 
developer forums affecting cyber security. 
 Other organizations, which produced similar reports, are also referenced in this report. 
 




 Page 8 of 40 
 
1.1 Scope of report 
This report provides a high-level analysis of the role of standardization and the 
ecosystem of cybersecurity standardisation, describing their evolution and identifying 
future challenges and opportunities. 
The present report does not aim to duplicate or overlap the results already provided in 
the other reports, but instead reference them and provide complementary considerations 
and recommendations on how to potentially support the European cybersecurity industry 
from standardisation work. 
 
1.2 Target Audience 
The target audience of this report is the European Commission, Member states, 
consumer associations and industry associations. 
 
1.3 Structure of the report 
Section 2 of this report provides a high level analysis on the role of standardization, the 
evolution of cybersecurity standards and future challenges and opportunities. Section 3 
provides an analysis on cybersecurity standards to identify potential areas of 
improvement and related actions. Section 4 concludes the report and provides high-level 
recommendations. 
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2 Detailed mapping of cybersecurity standards 
2.1 Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to produce a mapping and description of the ecosystem of 
cybersecurity standards including also those ICT standards that could be of the interest 
of the European cybersecurity industry. The latter group should include a) process 
standards (risk management, information sharing, certification processes), b) security 
and privacy requirements in technical standards (e.g. smart cards, 5G, IoT/M2M, cloud 
interoperability, eHealth, ITS, smart meters, smart grids), and c) specific cybersecurity 
standards including emerging technologies such as quantum-safe cryptography or 
quantum key distribution. In addressing such a mapping, the existence of already 
published documents is acknowledged and where appropriate the mapping is made by 
reference to the published documents (the referenced documents are listed in the 
Bibliography at the end of this document). 
2.2 Role of standardization 
2.2.1 General overview 
This report adopts the definition of ‘standard’ from ETSI4: “a document, established by 
consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the 
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context” (Derived from ISO/IEC 
Guide 2:1996, definition 3.2). 
A very broad generalisation of the role of standards is that their role is to provide 
interoperability of "things". This is particularly important for open markets, where users, 
can use different equipment providing the same service or function on the basis of a 
common standard. In this way, standards promote economies of scale and promote 
competition. It is also a broad generalisation that standards provide requirements to be 
met and do not provide instruction on how to implement a requirement (which is left to 
suppliers and manufacturers).  
Regarding security, these statements apply in a broad interpretation but with the slight 
modifier that many security standards, or more likely the security functions defined in 
standards, give assurance of the interoperability of "things" when subject to attack by 
hostile parties. Thus standards may address functionality (e.g. an encryption algorithm), 
application of that functionality (e.g. use of specific encryption mode (say counter 
mode)), and contextual use of that functionality (e.g. application of encryption to 
provision of confidentiality protection services). 
For cryptographic security parties that are required to interoperate will also require to 
share knowledge and functionality that will include the identification of keys and 
algorithms. Thus security standards have to address simple mechanical interconnection, 
semantic and syntactic shared meaning, and management of attributes and organisations 
to react to security transgressions in an appropriate manner. There is some overlap of 
cyber-security to wider societal functions and this is addressed in part by developments 
in the fields of "lawful interception" (to give law enforcement agencies authorised and 
confidential access to real time communications of explicitly identified targets), to 
"retained data" (to give appropriately authorised agencies access to the communications 
meta-data of explicitly identified targets), and in general the use of "critical 
infrastructure".  
One problematic domain in the security continuum is the protection of privacy. For the 
purposes of the present report the role of a security standard is to support some aspects 
of privacy such as confidentiality of data in storage or in transfer, to enforce proof of 
identity and authority to access data and so on. The policy aspects of privacy, the right to 
                                           
4 ETSI What are the standards. http://www.etsi.org/standards/what-are-standards 
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publish, the right of self-determination, and so forth are not fully addressed by security 
standards and they should be complemented by additional measures. 
2.2.2 Organisational interoperability 
There are classes of organisational management standards in security that define roles 
within organisations that seek to enforce a "need to know". From a security perspective 
when two organisations share data, they may transfer data securely by having a common 
Communications Security (ComSec) framework, but the ComSec exchange cannot make 
any inference on how data is treated prior to, or after, transfer. Thus the local IT security 
policy of the sending and receiving organisations is trusted to be equivalent and this trust 
may be reinforced by measures in the organisation. One important aspect in 
organisational interoperability is about the type of relationship: one to one, one to many 
or many to many. In the first case the interoperability is only between two organizational 
entities, while in the other cases a set of organizations have agreed on a common 
framework to exchange information. This aspect is relevant for setting up secure 
communication protocols among European entities, where a many to many relationship is 
preferred for European-wide regulation. 
2.2.3 Syntactic and Semantic interoperability 
Syntax cannot convey meaning and this is where semantics is introduced.  Semantics 
derives meaning from syntactically correct statements. Semantic understanding itself is 
dependent on both pragmatics and context. There are a number of ways of exchanging 
semantic information although the success is dependent on structuring data to optimise 
the availability of semantic content and the transfer of contextual knowledge (although 
the transfer of pragmatics is less clear). The most obvious examples of semantic 
containers for syntactically correct information are protocols whereby the protocol (e.g. 
an authentication protocol) gives context to message sets. This may be further extended 
using the concept of shared state as a means of identifying context and this is often 
embedded in protocol (e.g. an authentication protocol may go through states that include 
"Identified", "Challenge issued", "Response pending" prior to finalising on the state 
"Authenticated"). 
2.2.4 Electrical and mechanical interoperability 
Quite simply a device with a power connector using, for example, a Type- IEC 60906-2 
connection cannot accept power from anything other than a IEC 60906-2. Similarly, for 
example, a serial port complying to USB-Type-A will not be able to connect with a USB-
Type-C lead. In addition to simple mechanical compatibility there is a requirement to 
ensure electrical interoperability covering amongst others the voltage level, amperage 
level, DC or AC, frequency if AC, variation levels and so forth. 
2.2.5 Radio communication interoperability 
Radio (wireless) communication requires shared knowledge of frequency band, 
modulation technique, symbol rate, power, and so forth.. The nature of the physical 
media requires that radio protocols make provisions to maximise link reliability. 
 
2.3 Overview of published work 
ETSI TR 103 306 [1], from November 2015, has made a first attempt to outline the 
global cyber security ecosystem and has subsequently entered a regime of continuous 
update with every meeting of ETSI's CYBER group moving the picture forward. As such it 
can be stated that ETSI's TR 103 306 is the definitive statement on the makeup of the 
global cyber security ecosystem and in its scope addresses the role and interaction of 
SDOs, government, and industry. In addition to the ETSI report other analyses have 
asserted that the ecosystem is a bigger consideration than that normally made in 
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standards, and as was noted in the ENISA report "Definition of Cybersecurity - Gaps and 
overlaps in standardisation" (see ISBN 978-92-9204-155-7) even the definition of the 
boundary between cybersecurity and security in ICT in general is blurred. Further in 
developing a response to the Network Information Security Directive (NISD) it has been 
noted that the definition of what constitutes a standard or a specification in the Directive 
is fundamentally at odds with recognition of the bodies involved in development of 
standards. In particular, for Europe, the referencing Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 
excludes almost all of the bodies identified in ETSI TR 103 306 as only CEN, CENELEC, 
ETSI, ISO/IEC and ITU are recognized as standards bodies whereas industry and society 
at large recognises a much greater number of bodies. Thus, the present report mimics 
the approach taken by ETSI TR 103 306 and the ENISA publications in that it considers 
the nature of cyber security and from this addresses the contributors to standards. 
 
NOTE This report should be considered as an addendum to ETSI TR 103 
306 and to the ENISA report " Definition of Cybersecurity - Gaps and 
overlaps in standardisation" as it seeks to supplement the material in 
those documents with a view to making recommendations that are 
found in the final part of this report. 
 
The present document does not intend to re-write the content of existing work and as 
ETSI TR 103 306 is a comprehensive study that when combined with other publications 
from ETSI TC CYBER provide an active resource for analysing the current eco-system of 
global cyber-security initiatives adding another document to the pile is more likely to 
muddy the understanding of the environment than to simplify it. However, building on TR 
103 306 allows for a few alternative views of how the standards work that is being done 
is interrelated. This allows us to perform a gap and overlap analysis.  
The requirements for standards in the cybersecurity domain can be modelled as a cycle 
of actions that between them assist the community to: 
 
 Identify threats to, and vulnerabilities of, ICT devices and the services that run on 
them 
 Protect against those threats and vulnerabilities by providing mitigations 
 Detect by means of implementation of mechanisms and process that identify a 
current or imminent cybersecurity event (this requires prior work to identify 
where such events may occur) 
 Respond (implement ability to take action following a cybersecurity event) 
 Recover (implement resilience and restoration of impaired capabilities) 
 
Underpinning each of these activities is a core requirement to share security knowledge 
in a trusted and timely manner. Within Europe and in several other global regions the 
concept of CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) has been adopted as a sharing 
scheme and these have been further developed to use a set of standardised schemes 
(data definitions and transfer protocols) to categorise incidents. 
 




Figure 1. The security cycle recognised by CERTs. 
 
It is recognised that whilst there are a very large number of bodies that develop 
standards, it is also recognised that many service providers, manufacturers and 
governments are involved in a significant number of them. An unfortunate consequence 
is that each standards body is often in competition with each other, thus generating 
overlap in the provision of standards. This can constitute a risk to security because ICT 
infrastructures may be built on overlapping and conflicting security standards, which 
could generate vulnerabilities (in addition to increase the cost of implementing secure 
and interoperable systems). An additional concern is that competing standards may not 
still be able to provide a complete set of standards for a particular function or service. 
The so called “standards gaps” are often due to this phenomena, which prompt additional 
effort to address the gaps and generate even more standards, while a more effective way 
to address the gaps wold be a redaction of existing standards.  
 
ASSERTION Gaps in standards present the risk that additional 
standardisation effort is started without a structured plan. An effective 
wat to address standardization gaps would be to redact existing 
standards. 
 
The plain text variant of the above assertion is that it is not always right to add more 
standards when a gap is found. Similarly, if conflicting standards exist adding more 
standards may lead to increased conflict and all conflict increases risk, thus reducing risk 
requires removing standards from the market to remove the underlying conflict. 
Taking the model from ETSI TR 103 306, the global cyber security ecosystem can be 
visualised as six forms of group that are key categorisations for the identification of who 
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is involved in cyber security standardisation and in the development of collaborative 
mechanisms that support the CERT model for cyber security: 
 
1. forums that develop techniques, technical standards and operational practices; 
2. major IT developer forums affecting cyber security; 
3. activities for continuous information exchange; 
4. centres of excellence; 
5. reference libraries, continuing conferences; and  
6. heritage sites and historical collections. 
 
The security standardisation development eco-system has also got a very large number 
of complex relationships. Some of that complexity is shown in Figure 2 where industry 
led forums adopt and adapt standards from (say) ETSI, but ETSI also adopts and adapts 
standards from these same industry-led forums. As an example IEEE develops standards 
for Wireless LAN (802.11), adopted by the WiFi Alliance as WiFi standards, adapted in 
turn in 3GPP to define the use of 802.11 as a coexisting technology with (say) LTE, and 
then fed back into ETSI to determine use in transport (e.g. ITS group for LTE based V2X 
communications). It is also important to recognise that generic but wide ranging 
technical standards such as IEEE's 802.11 encompass a very large number of 
technologies, not all of which appear in the WiFi set, but some, such as variant 802.11p 
set the basis of co-operative ITS in both Europe and in wider global regions. 
As it has been indicated above, the analysis of cyber-security standardisation can be 
viewed in many different ways. From the CIA paradigm it can be asked who is addressing 
what in standards? Thus in Figure 2 core technology domains have been labelled with the 
principal standards bodies addressing technology aspects. 
Security standardisation can be viewed in many ways. In Figure 3 the view shown is of 
domains including protocols, which encompass semantics and syntax but that may also 
be considered independently. Similarly, whilst there is work on standardisation of 
cryptographic algorithms, their value does depend on their availability in specific domains 
and their role in a structured protocol. It is reasonable to state that all of the domains 
have standards leaders, but it is also fair to say that the causal and essential links 
between domains is not well defined. 
As described before, a similar survey and landscaping effort has been performed by 
ECSO in the ‘State-of-the-Art Syllabus, Overview of existing Cybersecurity standards and 
certification schemes’ [5]. In this report, the cybersecurity standards have bene classified 
for categories of applications. Standards and schemes are also identified and described. 
The report is quite exhaustive but (as described in the report itself), it is meant to be 
updated periodically to reflect changes in the status of the standards (update, 
termination or creation of new standards).  
For each of the standard, the report briefly discusses (extracted from [5]): 
 Focus: What is (main) area of applicability of this standard? 
 Associated Scheme and Governance: Does a scheme exist to assess, test or 
certify people, products, services, organisations or infrastructures against this 
standard? If there is an associated scheme, how is the scheme governed? Who is 
the Standard Developing Organisation, who is the certification scheme owner? 
What are the accredited third-party labs, if any? 
 Process: how does the assessment or certification process work? Is self-
declaration allowed? Are several different levels of security defined? 
 Page 14 of 40 
 
 Practice: Is this standard actually being used in practice for assessments or 
certifications? If so, what is the experience and perceived value in the market? 
How many subjects are certified? 
 Formal Status: Is there any associated legislation, official mandate or other 
government involvement? 
 Relation to other standards/schemes: Is there any official relation with other 
standards or schemes described in this document? 
The ECSO report does not provide specific general recommendations apart from the 
analysis on specific sets of standards 
ENISA has also produced a report on the identification of gaps in standardization in the 
cybersecurity domain [6]. The report provides an overview of the main standardization 
bodies involved in the drafting of cybersecurity standards and provides recommendations 
on mitigating standardization gaps. The first purpose of the ENISA report is to provide a 
guide for determining an appropriate understanding of the term ‘Cybersecurity’ to be 
used in the context of the intended use of the stakeholders and policy makers. The 
second purpose is to list organisations taking part in standardisation in the area of 
Cybersecurity, provide an overview of activities and identify gaps and overlaps. 
The conclusions of the ENISA report on standardization gaps and related mitigation 
techniques, which are relevant for this report, are (extracted from [6]): 
1. In some areas of standardisation, overlaps exists (like e.g. competing 
organizations as well as competing technical standardization approaches) and will 
probably persist due to the political interests of commercial as well as non-
commercial organizations. 
2. Looking at the dynamically changing landscape of tools and technologies, the lack 
of applicable standards leads to the situation where technology vendors keep 
proprietary solutions, while consumers are left without transparency on their 
systems. Classic approaches to verification of technical requirements (e.g. 
Common Criteria Protection Profiles) are complex and hard to keep-up with in 
dynamic markets, technologies and changing threat landscape. 
3. Privacy is one of the core European basic rights. It is evident that especially this 
aspect seems to have been left-out in the technical standards. Some industry 
practice standards (e.g. PCI DSS) as well as specific requirements exist, but this 
is not sufficient to enable neutral evaluation of technologies nor services to the 
national or European privacy regulations. 
4. One useful initiative at European level would be to set the overall requirements for 
security, privacy, and other related security requirements. There are many 
examples of these from ISO/IEC JTC 1, NIST, and other similar frameworks. What 
is lacking is a coherent method for bringing together these various frameworks, so 
when a System, Service or Product has been developed, then the appropriate 
framework can be used. The number of these frameworks should be minimised or, 
at least, the relationships between them need to be better understood. There are 
also of course legal requirements, such as those for Data protection, law 
enforcement, and Business such as trading information, which may be sensitive. 
These requirements need also to be put into the framework. 
5. Identification of security risks and threats. Too often security products and 
services are developed without understanding these important issues, and without 
considering the flexibility (such as replacing algorithms) and life cycle 
requirements from start to withdrawal from service. 
6. It is probably true to say that there are many different standards on several 
technologies available; what needs to be addressed is the reduction of the 
proliferation of very similar but incompatible tools and techniques and the 
provision of essential services to non-expert users. 




Figure 2. Relationships in the security standardisation development eco-system. 





Figure 3. Standardisation domains and key players.
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2.4 Testing, verification and assurance 
 
Testing is the root of proof in the core aspects of protocols and code. Tied to the role of 
testing is a wider concept of certification - a tactile proof of the tests. Illustrated in Figure 
4 is the conventional view of standards in testing 
 
Figure 4. Standards development lifecycle. 
 
Open source projects offer significant support at the start and end of this timeline. They 
offer a platform for proofs of concept, and they offer a platform for implementation. The 
bit in the middle, the 3-stage requirements model and the test models are almost 
entirely missing in open source projects. 
 
Open Source = Code to be implemented 
Open Standards = Abstract model of requirements 
 
Whilst conventional formal testing is essential to prove that normal behaviour is achieved 
the concern in security is that an attacker will seek to subvert the system's operation. 
Thus to give assurance through testing of a security function, the testing effort requires 
to attempt to subvert normal operation, or to gain access against the wishes of the 
system (e.g., in the intrusion detection tests or penetration test). Security breaches 
however may be evident (i.e. the attacker is prepared to break the system and to leave 
proof the system is broken) or non-evident (i.e. the attacker wishes to breach the system 
without leaving evidence of the break). Thus testing has to cover any means to subvert 
the system and in this case, standards and processes for achieving "penetration testing" 
of the system have to be written and the resulting tests performed. The problem here is 
that in complex systems many channels may be used in parallel to mount an attack and 
the attack may be built up over a long period of time.  
It is clear that the test strategies for most protocols and services do not adequately 
address the problem space of penetration testing and further work has to be done. 
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An addition consideration is that the testing phase can be further subdivided in a) 
conformance testing to a specific standard, where the product under test is tested 
against functional and non-functional requirements and b) interoperability testing where 
the focus is to ensure interoperability in general and secure interoperability in particular.  
2.5 Evolution of the connected world 
The world is connected and the model of connection that dominates is the Internet, using 
the Internet Protocol stack developed in the IETF. However, the Internet is not the actual 
infrastructure and the infrastructure is dominated by evolution of the telecommunications 
infrastructure. The telecommunications infrastructure is evolving towards domination by 
mobile devices and movement from fixed function nodes to virtualised functions that may 
be moved between physical nodes. This latter activity is exemplified by the activity in 
ETSI ISG NFV (ETSI Network Functions Virtualisation Industry Specification Group), and 
has been extended in other groups including ETSI ISG MEC (ETSI Industry Specification 
Group Mobile Edge Computing), and ETSI TC RRS (ETSI Technical Committee 
Reconfigurable Radio Systems) 
Communications services have similarly evolved from point-to-point circuit oriented 
telephony through packet oriented telephony and towards server based communication.  
The nature of the evolved (evolving) connected world has also led to a significant change 
in societal mores. Communication has changed for many individuals away from a set of 
discrete one-to-one conversations, and has embraced a slew of semi-broadcast 
notifications as stepping off points to shared discussion. This is perhaps best exemplified 
by postings on Facebook and similar social networking sites, and by the use of Twitter 
and similar short message posting sites. 
The technology of communications services has also evolved with a growth in the 
deployment of server based communications services. In such a communications model 
that has evolved from chat services many applications  open a shared space on a central 
server provide communication services from that point. This is in contrast to the 
conventional "circuit" connection paradigm between the communicating parties. In 
addition, there is increasing use of Over The Top (OTT) services, those services that are 
offered on the telecommunications network (most often associated to the Internet) 
without the awareness of the network provider and for which security is determined by 
the OTT provider and not by the traditional CSP. 
2.6 Design paradigms 
2.6.1 End to end security 
The classical model for good security is that it should provide end-to-end security. 
Unfortunately, this is a misnomer and a misdirection. One party's end-to-end may be 
another party's network security, or end-to-end security may imply only ComSec 
whereas in a data oriented world it may imply only ITSec (from birth to death of a data 
object). End-to-End security may be achievable in a system where the designer and 
deployer has appropriate control on all the main elements and interfaces. On the other 
side, these are often rare cases in the market. For example, the majority of IoT systems 
have different interfaces and this increase the complexity and difficulty in implementing 
end-to-end security. 
A more accurate model is peer-to-peer and is the model most suited to networks or 
elements. Each peer has to trust its partner peers and this should address all topologies: 
Point to point; Point to multi-point; Broadcast. It should also address all forms of 
symmetry: Symmetric bi-directional loads, asymmetric bi-directional, uni-directional. 
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2.6.2 CIA 
Security standardisation is complex as suggested above. The technical domain of security 
however has tended to address security as a set of core attributes that can be considered 
as a design paradigm. The most common of these is in the context of the CIA 
(Confidentiality Integrity Availability), as security dimensions. The security capabilities 
are selected from the CIA paradigm to counter risk to the system from a number of 
forms of cyber-attack. The common model is to consider security in broad terms as 
determination of the triplet {threat, security-dimension, countermeasure} such that a 
triple such as {interception, confidentiality, encryption} is formed. The threat in this case 
is the interception, which risks the confidentiality of communication, and to which the 
recommended countermeasure is encryption. 
Underpinning the CIA paradigm, and the triplet model, is a clear understanding of risk 
and threat, which should be complemented by a appropriate risk model like the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)’s Risk Management Framework (NIST SP 
800-37) [7] or the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)’s OCTAVE model.[8]. 
2.6.2.1 People or user centric security modelling 
In recent years the impact of ICT and in particular the Internet and increasingly the 
development of M2M and IoT technologies has introduced the concept of privacy 
protection as an element of security provisions. This offers a new paradigm of person 
centred security design. An example of the increasing complexity of this is shown in 
Figure 5 for the health sector. In this mode security technology falls under a supporting 
role to Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) and this will include conventional CIA 
capabilities. A    detailed description of privacy aspects and standards is out of scope of 
this report. 
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Figure 5. Person centric view of security and privacy (health sector viewpoint).
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2.7 Long term evolution of security provisions 
Many observers have noted that security is not a technology but a long term process. 
This is fairly well reflected in the management standards typified by the ISO 27000 series 
[9] that have broad similarities to the quality management series ISO 9000, the 
environmental management series ISO 14000 etc.  
However, one of the core aspects of security is that the threat model evolves over time. 
The investment in early attacks may mean that many attack modes take a significant 
time to appear but once developed are often made publicly available which modifies the 
risk calculation by impacting the metrics used to evaluate the likelihood of an attack, 
(e.g., knowledge and expertise of the attacker or the nature of equipment necessary to 
launch the attack. 
2.7.1 Quantum computing and cryptography 
There is considerable speculation in industry on the impact of quantum computing on 
security. The nature of the threat has been explored and published in ETSI EG 203 310 
[2], and is being further explored in the ISG QSC deliverable number 4 due for 
publication in Q1-2017. In particular, the following text from EG 203 310 [2] states (with 
some editorial extensions): 
 
"… if the promise of quantum computing holds true then the following 
impacts will be immediate on the assumption that the existence of viable 
quantum computing resources will be used against cryptographic 
deployments: 
 Symmetric cryptographic strength will be halved, e.g. AES with 128 bit keys giving 
128 bit strength will be reduced to 64 bit strength (in other words to retain 128 bit 
security will require to implement 256 bit keys). 
 Elliptic curve cryptography will offer no security. 
 RSA based public key cryptography will offer no security. 
 The Diffie-Helman-Merkle key agreement protocol will offer no security. 
NOTE: The common practice is to refer to the key agreement protocol developed by 
Messrs Diffie, Helman and Merkle as simply the Diffie-Helman or DH protocol as 
the formal recognition of Merkle's role was made after DH became the accepted 
term.  
With the advent of realisable Quantum Computers everything that has been 
transmitted or stored and that has been protected by one of the known to be 
vulnerable algorithms, or that will ever be stored or transmitted, will become 
unprotected and thus vulnerable to public disclosure." 
 
The developing text from ETSI ISG QSC-004 identifies the following recommendations to 
be able to determine the extent of the problem of evolution to a QC safe deployment of 
cryptography: 
 X = the number of years that public-key cryptography needs to remain unbroken. 
 Y = the number of years it will take to replace the current system with one that is 
quantum-safe. 
 Z = the number of years it will take to break the current cryptographic toolkit, 
using quantum computers or other means. 
 T = the number of years it will take to develop trust in quantum safe algorithms 
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Quote from development of QSC-004: 
 
"If "X + Y + T > Z" any data protected by that public key cryptographic 
system is at risk and immediate action needs to be taken. There is some 
limited ability to control T once a set of primitives are developed and put 
into applications, there is also some ability to assess Y but the value 
assigned to Y is very dependent on the nature of the cryptographic 
deployment and the visibility of the enabled devices. The research 
community in developing quantum computers, and in developing new 
mathematical analysis of existing algorithms, will always seek to minimise 
the value assigned to Z which puts increasing pressure on managing the Y 
factor to ensure that the simplified equation is always in favour of those at 
risk.  
As noted in EG 203 310 [2] the most pressing recommendation is that all 
users of cryptography are able to document and to trial the business 
continuity scenarios surrounding migration of their entire cryptographically 
protected set of assets to new, quantum safe protection. This will give a 
clear, by industry or by sector, assessment of the Y factor, and steps 
should be taken to ensure that as far as is possible that Y is minimised." 
 
Furthermore, the factor of crypto-agility requires not simply replacing keys but has to 
address changes to algorithms, keys and key management protocols. 
2.7.1.1 Quantum key distribution 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is not a security capability but a provisioning capability. 
As the correspondents Alice and Bob can successfully agree a key even in the presence of 
the adversary Eve, there is some potential for random number agreement across an 
optical link. On the other side of the coin, the random number that is agreed cannot be 
pre-provisioned so it cannot be used to support any other security function such as 
identification or authentication. 
Standardisation activity is addressed in ETSI ISG QKD. 
2.7.1.2 Quantum encryption 
It is somewhat unclear if quantum encryption is a real thing or not. The existence of 
quantum properties, particularly entanglement, suggests that for a pair of entangled 
photons, one at Alice, one at Bob, then the action on Alice's photon results immediately 
in the same action on Bob's photon. So in theory Alice and Bob can communicate 
securely at any distance. It is infeasible to detect the action by interception as there is no 
movement, hence entanglement (or as Einstein referred to it -- "spooky action at a 
distance") offers absolute confidentiality. Practically there is no movement though in this 
space and it remains very much a science research exercise that is very slowly moving 
into an engineering R&D exercise.  
No current standardisation activity is active. No standardisation effort is foreseen as a 
requirement to manage cyber security provisions in the EU. 
2.7.2 Next generation networks 
The nature of telecommunications has evolved in the past 20 years or so to become 
Internet Protocol centric. However, this tends to mask the level of functionality required 
and applies a single model for connectivity, QoS, GoS and security to all nodes of a 
network. This view is being challenged by a number of groups that have identified 
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difficulties in provisioning and maintaining a network that serves multiple, often 
conflicting, goals and media types. 
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3 Analysis of potential support to the European 
cybersecurity industry from standardisation work 
3.1 Overview 
As described before there are a number of goals of standards, the principal ones being 
interoperability, market control through freedom of access, market control through 
regulation, and market creation. The last of these was probably best seen in the 
development of digital cellular telephony wherein standardisation was driven into the 
market by mandates on use of spectrum. However, the environment for standards 
development has changed since the early days of 2G cellular and whilst standards are 
still developed through consensus by mostly voluntary effort of the stakeholders there is 
a market for success in standards that may actually drive fragmentation of the market. 
Fragmentation of the standards market is a reality. The impact of this is that standards 
themselves introduce risks as inevitably there is a need to bridge from one standard to 
another. Wherever a bridge exists it can be perceived and modelled as a system 
weakness as at least one aspect of interoperability is weak or non-existent. 
In attempting to address where European legislators and leaders should drive standards, 
and security standards in particular, some relatively arbitrary position has to be taken. 
The remainder of this report therefore takes the stance that ICT security has to be 
considered as a very important driver in the design of standards and should be held to a 
higher degree of accountability and oversight than it has in the past. The proliferation of 
connected smart or programmable devices on the market and the continual growth in 
market penetration of such devices is a threat if those devices do not get to the market 
with some degree of basic security. This has a consequence on market control and access 
in order to ensure that only those products and services which are able to demonstrate a 
well-defined level of conformance to security principles are made available for ICT. This 
has an impact on many areas of life from essential areas such as transport, health and 
wellbeing, to food supply, energy supply, freedom of movement and freedom from 
attack. 
The traditional model of standards development adopted by ETSI, ITU-T and ISO is being 
challenged and that has to be recognised. In the traditional development cycle a concept 
is driven through a relatively traditional waterfall development cycle that is shown in 
Figure 4. The conventions of this cycle are increasingly challenged by the open source 
community where the gap in time between a proof of concept and a reference 
implementation is often eradicated and the reference design, in the form of standards, 
may never exist. 
The role of standards in the market is to achieve interoperability and this does take time. 
The option of using open source projects to demonstrate the viability of a technology at 
the Proof of Concept point, and later to address the Reference Implementation point may 
reduce some of the delay associated to standards. However, the bit in the middle, the 
traditional heavy standardisation effort still requires to be done if an open market based 
on open standards is to be achieved. 
One aspect of standardisation that is understood by those deeply involved but which is 
often overlooked in the wider technical world is that standards are very competitive. This 
aspect of standards development of itself is problematic as in a voluntary market many 
conflicting technologies appear on the market. This is seen in many markets and has the 
potential to be destabilising to the market. 
In many standardisation areas there are gaps in standards that are in part closed 
by policy or by proprietary development. It is hopefully obvious that simply creating 
new standards will not lead to more security but may in fact lead to further 
fragmentation with more standards and more possibility of insecurity. 
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The underpinning paradigm that has been followed in the technical security standards 
work has for many years been the CIA - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability. However, 
in large systems it is increasingly difficult to simply apply the CIA paradigm as it has 





o The role of confidentiality protection is to ensure that information 
shared by Alice and Bob is intelligible only to Alice and Bob, and Eve. 
 
o Confidentiality has a close relationship to privacy (shared meaning in 
US- English) and to core concepts such as unobservability, anonymity, 
pseudonymity and unlinkability. For a generic system the more of the 
system that is exposed then the greater risk there is that an attacker 
can identify an attack path. However, making the entire system "secret" 
does not make it more secure as it may lead the operators of the 
system to a false sense of security, this model of "security by obscurity" 
has been discredited over a number of years and whilst making 
everything public is not to be recommended it is reasonable to assume 
that those intending to attack a system, even if external to the 




o The role of integrity protection is that if an unauthorized party 
modifies transmitted data, that modification is detectable by the 
authorized parties.. 
 
o Supply chain integrity is a special case of integrity and addresses the 
entire chain to the end user. In this instance the term integrity is closer 
to the meaning of the term used in written English and refers to the 
overall trustworthiness of the supply chain and not to the stability of 




o The Availability element of the CIA paradigm covers a wide range 
of aspects including access control, identification, authentication, 
reliability, resilience and monitoring (for the purpose of assuring 
availability). 
o Any system that is classified as Critical, and the services it supports, 
will almost inevitably become subject to a higher degree of 
accountability to 3rd parties than non-Critical systems. 
o Provisions   for   adequate   security   protection   may   require   to   
be independently verified. However, many of the existing schemes for 
such assurance are not scalable to very large and mutable systems. 
 
 
3.2 Certification and consumer/buyer confidence 
A significant step in giving security assurance to users and purchasers is the 
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (commonly known as 
Common Criteria or CC). The intent of CC is that its adoption permits comparability 
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between the results of independent security evaluations. ISO/IEC 15408 does so by 
providing a common set of requirements for the security functionality of IT products 
and for assurance measures applied to these IT products during a security evaluation. 
These IT products may be implemented in hardware, firmware or software. 
An important note that is found in the introduction of the Common Criteria 
is: 
"… the fact that an IT product has been evaluated has meaning only 
in the context of the security properties that were evaluated and the 
evaluation methods that were used. Evaluation authorities are advised 
to carefully check the products, properties and methods to determine 
that an evaluation will provide meaningful results. Additionally, 
purchasers of evaluated products are advised to carefully consider this 
context to determine whether the evaluated product is useful and 
applicable to their specific situation and needs." 
As such this reinforces the primary problem of security assurance and certification as 
being uncertainty regarding the deployment environment and context. 
There is a significant risk in using simple markings or certification of products when it 
comes to security as the environment may be unpredictable. This is why, Common 
Criteria certification should be (and it is usually true) complemented by a description of 
the test environment and product configuration against which the Common Criteria 
evaluation was performed. In a similar way, “label” concepts as it was recently proposed 
must include a description of the related testing environment and configuration.  
3.3 Extension of CE marking and labelling concept. 
The well-known CE mark is a pre-cursor of placing many items on the market in Europe 
and demands that product is compliant with certain standards to give confidence of 
safety. Specific CE marking is required in many domains including medical devices, toys 
and cooking equipment, and for Radio devices. 
There are no specific security requirements required in existing CE marking domains but 
it may be argued that for certain environments where a product has a specific security 
function that the relevant test and protocol standards are cited for the CE mark to be 
offered. 
It is noted that the CE mark has been criticised by ANEC5 and others in a number of 
publications. Such criticisms may not be valid, but they should be still taken in 
consideration in a possible extension of the CE marking to the security domain like the so 
called labelling concept described in COM(2017)477, Cybersecurity Package Proposal for 
a regulation6. The concern here is that security is contextual as described before. A 
surrounding concern is that it will take considerable time to develop the mark itself, to 
develop the standards that will be indicated by the mark, and finally to develop the 
market confidence in the mark. On the other sides, existing security standards could be 
used as a basis to support the label concept.  
One potential way to go to is the adoption of the collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) 
approach across SDOs. This has already been proposed in ETSI's "Design for 
Assurance" scheme in ETSI TS 102 165-1 wherein there is a strong rationale for the 
application of security measures rooted in a detailed, quantitative threat analysis. The 
positive element of a cPP approach is that by default a standard is developed by a 
community of like-minded organisations (i.e. it already meets the community and 
collaboration element of a cPP). Furthermore, a standard is an abstract set of 
requirements that have to be met rather than a definitive design to be rigorously adhered 
to. 
                                           
5 http://www.anec.eu/attachments/ANEC-SC-2012-G-026final.pdf 
6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/com-2017-477_en#proposal-for-a-regulation 
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3.4 Extension  of  ETSI  TR  103  303  as  guidance  to  standards 
makers. 
ETSI's TS 103 303, addressing key characteristics of ICT in Critical Infrastructure, could 
be extended to address the ICT security general cases. 
Taking the base principle in security of that for any system that is at risk of attack a very 
simplified model of protection is that based on the sequence of events identified in part 1 
of this report: 
 Identify threats to, and vulnerabilities of, ICT devices and the services that run on 
them 
 Protect against those threats and vulnerabilities by providing mitigations solutions 
and practices. 
 Implement mechanisms and processes, which identify a current or imminent 
cybersecurity event (this requires prior work to identify where such events may 
occur. In other words, a training phase of the detection system). 
 Implement respond mechanisms (implement ability to take action following a 
cybersecurity event) 
 Implement recover mechanisms (implement resilience and restoration of impaired 
capabilities) 
This can be further simplified as a set of actions to take as: 
 Plan (for the CERT recognised Identify and Protect actions) 
 Detect 
 React (for the CERT recognised Respond action) 
 Recover 
The  key  assertion  to  make  is  that  any  reaction  without  a  plan,  reaction  without 
knowledge of what is being reacted to, and reaction without a means to recover, is an 
ineffective reaction. The role of standards in this cycle is to ensure consistency in how 
each of these actions is performed and to then provide a sound technical basis for both 
the means to protect and the means to share knowledge to ensure that all systems work 
together to protect themselves and their neighbours. 
For any ICT system the identification of the stable state is a prerequisite to 
determining it is under attack and with the assertion that immutability is not an 
achievable or desirable state and that a mathematical statement of the stable or 
normal state is unlikely to be achievable or accurate the following should be addressed 
by the responsible parties of the system during the planning and detection phases: 
 Identification of normal usage patterns 
 Fore-planning of exceptional usage patterns 
 Identification of normal hysteresis level in the system 
o This requires knowledge of how long the system requires to become 
stable (i.e. to resort to a normal state) after an impulse like stimulus 
(e.g. a step change in network traffic loads either predicted or 
exceptional). 
  Identification of standard deviation from normal behaviour in the system 
o Normal behaviour, as suggested above, is rarely constant or static 
but operates within certain bounds. Knowledge of these bounds to 
determine normal versus exceptional behaviour is essential to determine 
if the behavioural changes in the network lead to CI risk. 
  Identification of long term trends in the system (including seasonal trends) 
o As above but noting that there may be seasonal changes in the 
expectation of normal (e.g. higher demand for electricity in winter as more 
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households use heating, therefore the summer time normal figure cannot 
be used as a normal figure in winter). 
 
3.5 Areas for future standardisation mandates. 
 
4.4.1 Policy direction 
 
It is strongly suggested that, as standards proliferation leads to market 
fragmentation and thus to increased risk, measures should be put in place to withdraw 
standards from the market and to mandate certain provisions for ICT devices and 
services prior to them being placed on the market. The policy measures should 
therefore place security proof and assurance within the market access framework. For 
standards development bodies this may require reinforcement of Harmonised Standards 
for security functions as opposed to mass provision of lower level technical 
specifications. 
 
It is recognised that this is a politically sensitive area and has some impact on market 
access. 
 
4.4.2 Integrity measures 
 
 
When considering recovery, the recovered system should exhibit the same overall 
behaviour but may achieve that in a different way from before the attack. In such an 
event the same steps as determining the initial stable state have to be taken. 
 
4.4.3 Availability measures 
 
The model for any "at risk" system is to give access to system components and 
operations on a "need to know" basis. Whilst some systems may require physical 
isolation and demand only physical access with detailed multi-factor  authentication  
schemes  in  place,  the  reality  of  large  scale integration of ICT capabilities 
suggests that the norm will become that all systems will have some form of remote 
control or remote monitoring in addition to direct onsite control and monitoring. 
 
Actions which impact the system should be accounted for. This may be achieved by 
simple logging but accounting records should be protected with tamper resistant 
systems, which are able to retain evidence of tampering attempts. 
 
Access control systems should not inhibit access where an override may be necessary 
to allow for instances such as providing critical care or to prevent escalation of an 
incident. 
 
4.4.4 Resilience and recovery measures 
 
When a system has been compromised it is reasonable to assume that when it is 
recovered it will perform the same set of functions but the means to perform those 
functions will be different from those used prior to the compromise. 
 
The key points for successful resilience and recovery 
are: 
 
 Has the underlying attack been defeated? 
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 Has the weakness or set of weaknesses in the system that allowed the attack 
to be launched been isolated? 
 
 Has the weakness or set of weaknesses that allowed the attack been removed? 
 
 Have relevant stakeholders and partners been informed? 
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4 Summary and Recommendations 
Standards in general are designed to give assurances of interoperability of two or more 
independently developed implementations of a device or service. Security standardisation 
extends the interoperability goal to provide assurance that users of devices and services 
will not be subject to malicious attacks against their identity, their communication 
content or their communication intent. In addition, the providers of services are given 
assurance that they are protected from malicious actions of their peers and their 
customers. 
Noting that attackers will evolve their methods of attack over time, and recruit devices, 
protocols and services in novel ways to cause harm, it is important to ensure that those 
devices and services are themselves able to evolve their defences over time to limit the 
level of damage that attackers can inflict. The role of standards in this goal of 
maintenance of security is itself critical and requires that vendors and operators work 
together to bring security agility to the market.  
The scope of "cyber" is growing with few devices or services being developed that are 
either not in part enabled by software, or having connectivity capability. The rationale 
therefore is that devices which have either connectivity or software modifiable 
functionality should be protected against exploit of these software and connectivity 
capabilities. 
 
Key recommendations to ensure that security is properly addressed are the 
following: 
 
 EU  member  states  should  define  measures  that  mandate certain provisions 
for ICT devices and services prior to them being placed on the market 
 Policy measures should place security proof and assurance within the market 
access framework. 
 SDOs should be requested to reinforce the Harmonised Standards approach 
for security functions. 
 The EU should consider sponsoring research and standardisation of means 
that give authoritative measurement of system integrity in mutable systems. 
 The EU should consider sponsoring research and standardisation of means 
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5.3 Cyber security sources on-line 
 
The following sources are aimed at the development community and contain a number of 
security recommendations for each platform. In addition the various forums also host 
discussion on threat mitigation, best practices, user interface design to minimise user 
uncertainty in the use of security features and so on. A complete and updated list is 
maintained in ETSI TR 103 306 by ETSI TC CYBER. 
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data centre platforms. https://forums.aws.amazon.com/forum.jspa?forumID=30 
Android Developers Forum. A developer forum for applications running on the Android 
OS.http://developer.android.com/develop/index.html 
Apple iOS Dev Center. A developer forum for applications running on the iOS OS. 
https://developer.apple.com/devcenter/ios/index.action 
Apple Safari. A developer forum for applications operating via the Safari browser. 
https://developer.apple.com/devcenter/safari/index.action 
Blackberry/QNX. A developer forum for applications operating on the Blackberry OS. 
http://developer.blackberry.com/ 
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http://www.bmc.com/solutions/cloud-computing/cloud-computing-management/Cloud-
Computing-Management-CCM.html 
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http://www.freebsd.org/projects/ 
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Cisco Developer Network. A developer forum for applications running on Cisco OS 
platforms. 
http://developer.cisco.com/web/partner/search?technologyIds=a0G400000070wGiEAI 
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Google Chrome. A developer forum for applications running on the Chrome browser. 
https://plus.google.com/+GoogleChromeDevelopers/posts 
Google Developers. A developer forum for applications running on the Google 
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HP Cloud Services. A developer forum for applications running on HP cloud platforms. 
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platform. https://developer.apple.com/icloud/index.php 
Intel Cloud Builders. A developer forum for applications running on Intel cloud 
platforms. http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/cloud-computing/cloud-builders-
provide-proven-advice.html?cid=sem116p9128 
Jive apps developers. A developer forum for applications running on Jive. 
https://developers.jivesoftware.com/community/index.jspa 
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OpenStack Developer Community. A developer forum for applications running on the 
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3GPP  Third Generation Partnership Project 
AC  Alternating Current 
C2C-CC Car to Car Communication Consortium 
CC   Common Criteria 
CEN  European Committee for Standardization 
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
CERT   Computer Emergency Response Team 
CIA   Confidentiality Integrity and Authenticity 
C-ITS   Co-operative Intelligent Transport Systems 
ComSec  Communications Security 
cPP   Collaborative Protection Profile 
cPPP   contractual Public Private Partnership 
DC  Direct Current 
DDoS   Distributed Denial of Service 
DSM   Digital Single Market 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
ERM  Radio Spectrum Matters 
ERNCIP European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure 
ESI  Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures 
FIPS  Federal Information Processing Standard 
GoS  Grade of Service 
HL7  Health Level Seven International 
IACS  Industrial Automation and Control Systems 
ICT   Information and Communication Technologies 
IEC  The International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF  Internet Engineering Task Force 
IoT   Internet of Things 
ISO  International Standards Organization 
ITS   Intelligent Transport Systems 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
ISG  Industry Specification Group 
ISI  Information Security Indicators 
LI  Lawful Interception 
M2M   Machine to Machine 
MTS  Methods for Testing and Specification 
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NIST  National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NFV  Network Functions Virtualisation 
OTT   Over The Top 
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R&RMP  Resilience and Recovery Management Plan  
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SCADA  Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
SDO  Standards Developing Organization 
SWD   Staff Working Document  
TC  Technical Committee 
TCCE  TETRA and Critical Communications Evolution 
TR   Technical Report 
WiFi  Wireless Fidelity 
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